February 9, 2026 marks a milestone in the regional integration process with the entry into force of MERCOSUR Trade Facilitation Agreement (CMC Decision 29/19) between Argentina and Brazil. An instrument that we have named AFC PLUS because it surpasses the global standard of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Unlike the classic regime of the Ouro Preto Protocol, this agreement introduces a system of partial and phased implementation (Art. 21). Following the deposits by Brazil (October 2024) and Argentina (December 2025), the agreement enters into force TODAY for both countries.
What is the MERCOSUR AFC PLUS?
The TFA Plus is a regional multilateral agreement that aims to simplify and expedite import, export, and transit procedures within the bloc. It is inspired by the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), to which it explicitly refers in Article 1, but adds a regional layer of obligations. It regulates transparency (online publication), risk management, the use of single windows, cooperation between border authorities, and other issues. For example, the Agreement facilitates the release of goods within 12 business hours of their presentation in the green channel, or 48 business hours in the orange and red channels. The objective is clear: to reduce costs that, according to the OECD, can represent up to 14% of the value of trade in middle-income countries.
Historical Background
The development of the MERCOSUR Trade Facilitation Agreement was an intensive process that took place between the end of 2018 and December 2019, following this institutional path:
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- The founding mandate (2018): During the CLIX Ordinary Meeting of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission (CCM), Directive No. 49/18 was approved, which not only changed the name of Technical Committee No. 2 to "Customs Affairs and Trade Facilitation", but also gave it the specific competence to prepare a draft intra-MERCOSUR agreement on the matter.
- The first draft (November 2018): Under the Pro Tempore Presidency of Uruguay (PPTU), the foundational working document was presented, which served as the basis for preliminary discussions between the delegations.
- Intensive technical negotiation (First half of 2019): Under Argentina's Pro Tempore Presidency (PPTA), negotiations on the text formally began at Customs headquarters. In May 2019, after several revisions and a key videoconference, the Joint Committee No. 2 reached a consensus on almost all of the articles, with the exception of a single point related to trade formalities.
- Political Elevation and Consensus (Second Half of 2019): The project was submitted to the Common Market Group (GMC) in June 2019. During Brazil's Pro Tempore Presidency (PPTB), additional efforts were made to reach the necessary consensus to resolve the pending article.
- Final approval (December 2019): Following the final approval of the project by the GMC on December 3, 2019, Decision CMC 29/19 was finally sanctioned by the Common Market Council during its LX Ordinary Meeting in Bento Gonçalves.
Partial validity vs. Ouro Preto
Article 21 of the agreement is brief but revolutionary. It breaks with the 'all or nothing' logic of the Ouro Preto Protocol. Traditionally, Article 40 of that protocol requires that the rules enter into force simultaneously 30 days after all members report their accession. AFC PLUS, however, stipulates that it enters into force 60 days after the deposit of the second instrument. For those who ratify later, the clock runs individually (60 days post-deposit).
Argentina and Brazil: Validity
Following the timeline, Brazil approved the MERCOSUR Trade Facilitation Agreement through Legislative Decree No. 98/2023 and deposited its instrument of ratification on October 11, 2024. Argentina, after the approval of Law 27.766, made its deposit on December 11, 2025. As this was the second deposit, the countdown under Article 21 was activated. Consequently, the agreement entered into force for both countries on February 9, 2026.
Chronology
| Institutional Milestone | Date | State / Consequence |
| Signing in Bento Gonçalves | 05/12/2019 | Approval of the Decision CMC 29/19. |
| 🟢Brazil Approval | 21/09/2023 | Legislative Decree No. 98/2023. |
| 🟢Brazilian Depot | 11/10/2024 | First official ratifier. |
| 🔵Argentine Approval | 21/10/2024 | National Law No. 27.766. |
| 🔵Argentina Warehouse | 11/12/2025 | Activate the countdown of Art 21. |
| 🟢🔵ENTRY INTO FORCE (AR-BR) | 09/02/2026 | Full bilateral validity. |
Facilitation does not imply reducing controls
Adopting trade facilitation guidelines in no way implies reducing the level of control over the international flow of goods; on the contrary, it requires greater controls, but in an intelligent and efficient manner, without harming the fluidity of legitimate trade, which represents the vast majority of international merchandise traffic, and concentrating resources where the risk is real.
The application of effective controls ensures the correct collection of taxes, the proper implementation of national economic policy, and the adequate protection of society (in matters of health, safety, etc.). This can be achieved through the application of modern techniques and technologies, improving the quality of controls in an internationally harmonized manner.
The challenge is to improve control, making it more efficient, without negatively impacting logistics chains. Argentina and Brazil are located far from their main purchasing markets, making it essential to reduce costs and times without compromising control.
Aristotle's concept of the "golden mean," developed in his work "Nicomachean Ethics," provides an excellent philosophical framework for explaining the relationship between customs control and trade facilitation. According to Aristotle, the golden mean is the virtuous balance between two vicious extremes: excess and deficiency. Applied to the relationship between customs control and facilitation, one could argue that the golden mean lies in implementing a customs system that adequately balances both objectives, avoiding both an overload of regulations that hinder trade (excessive control) and a relaxation of measures that would compromise security and regulatory compliance (insufficient control).
In this context, customs controls should not be so excessive as to create unnecessary barriers, but neither can they be so lax as to allow smuggling or fraud. At the same time, trade facilitation should not eliminate the controls necessary to guarantee security and regulatory compliance. Finding that middle ground between the two is the ongoing challenge for effective and fair customs administration.
In 1999, the WCO incorporated "Trade Facilitation" as one of its objectives alongside customs control, and in 2005, the SAFE Framework of Standards incorporated the two concepts into its name: Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade.
Specific implications for operators
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- Advance Opinions: Obligation to issue binding advance rulings on classification and origin if requested, and their extension to customs valuation is encouraged.
- One-stop shop and digitizationThe States Parties shall work on the interoperability of their electronic systems to facilitate the exchange of data, ensuring confidentiality and data protection in accordance with the domestic law of each and, where appropriate, the mutual recognition of electronic certificates and documents.
- Risk management and selectivityBorder controls should be based on risk profiles and allow for advance clearance, reducing redundant physical inspections.
- Coordinated Border ManagementCustoms, health agencies, transport authorities and security forces should coordinate their controls at border posts, airports and ports, ideally at common times.
- Use of the Time Study for Clearance and the WCO Data Model, the digitalization (Paperless customs) and the intensive use of information technology.
- The agreement promotes programs of Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) and other compliance certifications, with benefits such as fewer inspections or differentiated controls.
WTO AFC vs. MERCOSUR AFC
| Feature | AFC WTO (Bali) | AFC PLUS (MERCOSUR) |
| Dispatch Times | General recommendation of speed. | 12h (Green Channel) / 48h (Orange/Red). |
| Data Standard | Encourage the use of standards international. | Required: Data Model of the WCO. |
| Validity | Global (when 2/3 of members ratified it). | Bilateral / Stepped (Art. 21). |
| Customs Transit | General freedom of movement. | Mandatory implementation from SINTIA. |
| Digital Signature / VUCE | Promotes establishment of one-stop shops. | Mutual recognition and mandatory interoperability. |
Institutional
The WTO has a Trade Facilitation Committee that monitors implementation and a dedicated secretariat. MERCOSUR does not create a new body; it channels its treatment within the framework of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission (CCM), in the corresponding instance, which can facilitate the rapid resolution of any conflicts that may arise.
Conclusions
The WTO created the model; MERCOSUR is trying to implement the rules on the ground at border crossings such as Paso de los Libres-Uruguaiana, Puerto Iguazú-Foz do Iguaçu, and Santo Tomé-São Borja, to name just a few. The interoperability of single windows and coordinated border management will require investments in infrastructure, coordinated IT systems, and training for officials.
This substantial difference of the AFC PLUS The difference with its multilateral counterpart in Geneva lies in the rigor of its technical language. While the WTO Agreement merely 'encourages' the use of international standards, the MERCOSUR text, for example, in its Article 7, establishes the obligation to apply the WCO Data Model to integrate the declarations of customs destinations and operations. This is not a subtlety for computer scientists; it is the mandate to speak a common 'customs language' that guarantees real interoperability, or for example, in its Article 14 where it directly mandates the implementation of International Customs Transit Information System (SINTIA) in a certain period.
It should be noted that several aspects regulated by the Agreement already have Mercosur regulations governing them; the qualitative value of this validity is that they are now incorporated by a law of the parliament of each State Party, which gives greater strength to their effective implementation.
In short, in this scenario of partial and phased implementation, the MERCOSUR This demonstrates unprecedented institutional maturity: the ability to move forward with those who are ready, without waiting for the reluctant (I wish the same had happened with the MERCOSUR Customs Code, approved by Argentina and Brazil but still pending in Paraguay and Uruguay). The challenge for Argentina and Brazil now is to transform this "regulatory software" into a tangible reality at border crossings. At the end of the day, integration law teaches us a pragmatic lesson that should be the guiding principle of any modern customs administration: Facilitation is not something to be proclaimed, it is something to be implemented.

Download link for the Agreement: You are invited to read and share it.
References:
– Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Paraguay (News Portal). “Brazil deposits instruments of ratification relating to trade facilitation and Mercosur digital signature certificates.” Asunción, October 11, 2024. Available at: https://www2.mre.gov.py/index.php/noticias-de-embajadas-y-consulados/brasil-deposita-instrumentos-de-ratificacion-relativos-facilitacion-del-comercio-y-certificados-de-firma-digital-del-mercosur
– Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Paraguay (News Archive). “Argentina deposits the instrument of ratification of the MERCOSUR Trade Facilitation Agreement.” Asunción, news published on December 12, 2025. Available at: https://www.mre.gov.py/argentina-deposita-instrumentos-de-ratificacion/
Note of Acknowledgement: The author wishes to express his special gratitude to the Ms. María Luisa Carbonell, Alternate National Coordinator representing Argentine Customs before the Technical Committee No. 2 (CT2) "Customs Affairs and Trade Facilitation"Their invaluable technical collaboration and their willingness to share their perspective from the very "factory" where this Agreement was conceived have been key to the depth of this analysis.
The author is a Member (Judge) of the National Tax Court. University Professor. Specialized in Higher Education Teaching (UCC). Professor at the National University of Córdoba (UNC), Blas Pascal University (UBP), Austral University and Universidad del Rosario (Colombia). Professor and member of the Academic Committee of the Specialization in Customs Law at the National University of La Plata (UNLP). Member of the Drafting Group of the MERCOSUR Customs Code. Author of the book: "The World Customs Organization. Past, present and future.". Tirant Lo Blanch Publishing House, Valencia City, Spain. Year 2021 - Email: [email protected]
