Buenos Aires, February 2003
CARS AND SEEN:
File No. 14.486-A entitled FITALSE SA C/DGA S/REC. OF APPEAL, and
CONSIDERING:
I.- That at fs. 115/124 the plaintiff firm, through its representative, files an appeal against Resolution DPLA DVI No. 4476/00 issued by the 2nd Head of the Department. Customs Legal Procedures of the DGA in the file. EAAA No. 420.458/96, a resolution by which the challenge by said firm against the customs settlement that had been formulated for the application of the minimum specific duty in relation to import clearance No. 71.156-4/96 was rejected, also ordering and consequently executing the guarantee given at the time (for the difference between the settlement with the ad valorem tariff initially applied by the plaintiff and the settlement with the aforementioned specific duty). The plaintiff, who basically maintains the inapplicability of the specific duty and then the application to the case of the maximum ad valorem duty consolidated in the GATT, 35%, since the application of the DIEM applied by the customs exceeds said maximum tariff, formulates a statement on the minimum specific duties until reaching the one established by decree 998/95 with a term of validity until 31.12.96 and which would therefore include the dispatch of the case. The plaintiff refers to the background of the issue and in this sense basically to the fact that the customs judge denied the evidence offered by her party in the challenge procedure since the appealed resolution was based on the fact that the application of the DIEM was appropriate (in this case, the one established by decree 998/95 for the merchandise in question) by application in turn of one of the safeguards (provided for in annex VII of the Marrakesh Agreement) that had been applied since the issuance of Resolution. MEyOSP 1696/93 and which would have a validity period from then on of eight years. The plaintiff maintains that the requirements established in art. 663 of the CA for the imposition of the DIEM in question and also - that the imposition (by the administrative body) of DIEM higher than 35% is a violation of International Treaties (the GATT and the Marrakesh Agreement approved by letter 24.425), emphasizing in this respect the supremacy of international treaties over any other legal provision of internal law (supremacy today established in the CN). It maintains that the maximum tariff of 35% - which it claims is applicable in the case - corresponds (and not entirely to the DIEM of decree 998/95) because, since this limit could only be exceeded by virtue of the Agreements on Safeguards or on Dumping or on Subsidies, there was no procedure or rule on the basis of said Agreements that allowed such exceedance at the time of filing the case. On the other hand, it states that the DIEMs in force in 1996 (the year in which the proceedings were filed) were not the result or consequence of a safeguard that had been applied since 1993 (as stated in the appealed resolution), because if this had been the case, the ME (safeguard application authority) would not have initiated the regulated procedure for this purpose (for the importation of footwear) only in 1997 (Resol. ME 226/97 of 14.2.97). Finally, it refers to the interpretation of the WTO bodies on the scope of the DIEM (an interpretation that it understands to be favorable to its position) and thus affirms that of the ME itself based on Resolution ME 123/00. It offers evidence and requests that the customs tax claim be dismissed insofar as it exceeds 35% ad valorem in this case.
II.- That on pages 132/134 back, the fiscal representative attaches the administrative acts in the background of this case (file EAAA No. 420.458/96) and responds to the transfer of the appeal. He refers to the plaintiff's grievances, arguing against them. He invokes in favor of the fiscal position art. 11 of Annex VII of the Agreement (of Marrakesh) approved by law 24.425 of 1994, insofar as it provides for the ultra-activity (for a specific period that includes or reaches the dispatch of the proceedings, in 1996) of the safeguard measures that were in force at the time, and this because, according to him, the measure in question (the DIEM required by customs in the case, those of decree 998/95) is a safeguard measure that had been established since MEyOSP Resolution 1696/93. The plaintiff also invokes in his favor Resolutions ME Nos. 226 and 987/97 insofar as, according to him, the DIEM should have been applied to all imports of footwear; and maintains that Resolution ME 806/98, which established that the amount resulting from the application of DIEM could not exceed 35% ad valorem of each transaction, did so exclusively for products in Chapters 51 to 63 of the Nomenclature (at that time the NCM), so that footwear (of Chapter 64) was not included in the aforementioned application of the maximum ad valorem (35%), understanding, he says, that because footwear fell within the scope of the safeguard established by Resolution ME 987/97. The plaintiff invokes case law that he considers favorable to his position and opposes the evidence offered by the plaintiff by reason of the provisions of Law 25.239. Requests that the appealed customs decision be confirmed.
III.- That at pages 140 and back the plaintiff invokes a customs resolution in a case that the plaintiff claims is analogous to the case at hand and in which the right that its party maintains in the present cause is recognized, attaching in this regard the documentation that is copied at pages 135/139. At pages 141 the opposition of the treasury to the production of the evidence offered by the plaintiff is rejected for the reasons invoked therein, without prejudice to which the production of said evidence is partially rejected in any case, as inadmissible or unnecessary, and clarification is required (from the plaintiff) regarding the remaining evidence, while the treasury is notified of the aforementioned presentation at pages 135/139. At pages 151 and back the plaintiff invokes other precedents in which the customs office would have also resolved issues similar to those in the case in the same sense that its party maintains in the present case, attaching in this regard the documentation that is copied on pages 142/150; of this last presentation, the transfer to the tax authority is also available on pages 154. On pages 153 and back and on pages 155/156, the tax authority replies, respectively, to the transfers that had been arranged on pages 141 and 154. On pages 160, the plaintiff states (clarification that had been requested in the aforementioned order on pages 141) that for the reasons indicated - the production of the evidence on which it remained to provide would be unnecessary; so that except for the documentary copy submitted by the plaintiff, with the appeal and also subsequently - no evidence has been produced, offered by the parties, in these proceedings (so that once the case was elevated to Chamber G - it was not appropriate to put the cause to argue). At fs. 165 the investigating member orders, as a measure to better provide (art. 1143 of the CA), a request for reports to the Ministry of Economy and O.yS.P. (at fs. 166 the plaintiff formulates considerations on the aforementioned measure). At fs. 170 it is ordered to reiterate the measure, and the request is finally fulfilled at fs. 174, and the result of which is seen by the parties (see fs. 175). At fs. 176 the proceedings are elevated to this Chamber G and are submitted for judgment. At fs. 177 the plaintiff, when answering the view conferred, requests that the report produced as a measure to better provide be expanded and/or clarified. This request is rejected on page 178.
IV.- That according to the records of the administrative acts. background of this case (expte. EAAA Nº 420.458/96) the plaintiff firm documented, through dispatch Nº 77.156-4/96 registered at the customs of Buenos Aires on 20.6.96/3.312/40, the import for consumption of 45 pairs of footwear with rubber soles and PU laminated fabric uppers (exterior covering surface made of PU laminated fabric, artificial plastic material and synthetic nylon fabric, accessories made of plastic laminate and synthetic nylon fabric), Pony brand, for men, sizes 6402.99.00 to 29, the shaft does not cover the ankle, laced, of PA (NCM) 9.289, merchandise originating in the People's Republic of China, the plaintiff initially liquidating ad-valorem import duties with a rate of 24.202% (for an amount of US$ 998), and other taxes (statistics, VAT, and advances on VAT and Profits), with a total amount (duties and other taxes) of US$ 95. During the processing of said clearance, the customs service demanded the adjustment of the tax liquidation based on the application of the DIEM of decree 8,60/28.483 (US$ 8,60 per pair), which led to the halting of the clearance and a new liquidation with the application of the DIEM, which resulted in an amount only for duties - of US$ 3.312 (DIEM US$ 49.731 x 20.6.96 pairs) and from there a new liquidation of all taxes (with adjustments of VAT and of the advances of VAT and Income Tax due to the adjustment of duties, for a total of US$ 24.202), the plaintiff paying, on the same 1.7.96, the total amount of self-assessed taxes (US$ or $ 25.529) and presenting on 24.202 - a guarantee for US$ or $ 49.731 (amount of the difference between the amount self-assessed and paid -$ 4.7.96- and the amount resulting from the customs requirement for application of the DIEM -$ 465), for which reason the merchandise was withdrawn to the square, on 8, under the guarantee regime and with prior challenge (art. 420.458 of the CA) of the liquidation required by customs (up to here, see the evidence of the documentation of the referred dispatch contained in the envelope on fs. 96 of the cited file 1/4, envelope in which also appear the payment certificate and the evidence of the guarantee given and of the release of the merchandise as well as on the back of the envelope - the observation of the customs inspector to adjust the liquidation to the specific duties, and see the challenge on fs. 11/12, the resolution of the withdrawal under bail on fs. 13, the guarantee control form on fs. 14, and withdrawal procedures on pages XNUMX/XNUMX, always from the aforementioned file).
At fs. 15 the challenge was processed, partially denying the evidence offered by the plaintiff (this denial was confirmed at fs. 19 as a result of the revocation that the plaintiff filed at fs. 17). At fs. 21 there is a technical report from the Verification Division; and at fs. 29 there is a technical report from the Computer Tariff Division. At fs. 30/31 legal opinion 2304/97 was issued. At fs. 33 the informative evidence offered by the plaintiff was denied. At fs. 35 the plaintiff made a presentation in which it made considerations on the maximum tariff agreed in the GATT and attached the documentation in a copy on file at fs. 36/71. At fs. 74/76 a copy of the Resolution was added. ME 806/98 (which the plaintiff had invoked in support of its position, see pages 77 and back and file ADGA 425.895/98 added -on 3 pages- to pages 78). On pages 79 and 82 there are reports from the Regulatory Division, and the last one included the documentation in a copy on file on pages 83/87. On pages 89 the Verification Division ratified the initial observation that gave rise to the contested liquidation. Finally, on pages 93/96 the resolution appealed in this case was issued.
V.- That the central point of the issue brought to the attention of this Court, in the terms in which the litigation has been raised, lies essentially in determining whether the application of the specific duty established (for the merchandise in the clearance of the autos, of PA NCM 6402.99.00, of US$ 8,60 per pair of the respective footwear, and for the entire year 1996) by decree 998/95 in force at the time of the referred clearance, is appropriate, application that in the case has been made by the customs, initially by ordering to stop the clearance because the plaintiff did not liquidate in accordance with such application (but with the ad valorem tariff of 29%) and subsequently in the appealed resolution by rejecting the plaintiff's challenge against the liquidation made with said application (liquidation by which, in turn, the amount to be guaranteed for the withdrawal to the market of the merchandise had been determined - difference between the aforementioned ad valorem liquidation and the aforementioned liquidation with the duty) specific-), or if on the contrary such application is not appropriate (plain and simple) as the plaintiff maintains, or if such application - as the plaintiff also invokes - cannot exceed the maximum tariff of 35% consolidated in the GATT.
The customs argument, in addition to pointing out that the challenge procedure was not the way to raise the claim of unconstitutionality made by the plaintiff (claim that resulted from the plaintiff's claim that decree 998/95 cannot be opposed to an International Treaty ratified by law - the Marrakech Agreement approved by law 24.425 - by applying a tax that exceeded the maximum level of 35% ad valorem consolidated in said Agreement, see 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the recitals of the appealed resolution), consisted fundamentally in that the challenged measure (the specific right of decree 998/95) constitutes a safeguard measure dictated as a consequence of Resol. ME 1696/93 (and therefore is opposable in the terms of the Agreement itself - to the aforementioned maximum consolidated tariff) while the criterion of Resol. ME 806/98 (criterion in the sense of admitting that the application of the specific duty cannot exceed the amount resulting from applying the maximum tariff of 35% ad valorem) because it did not include within its scope the products of chapter 64 of the NCM.
The plaintiff essentially maintains, firstly, that the specific duty in question is not applicable, plainly and simply, because the Executive Branch, when issuing Decree 998/95 establishing the specific duty, did not comply with the requirements provided for that purpose by Article 663 of the CA, and also maintains that its eventual application cannot exceed the maximum tariff of 35% consolidated in the GATT (supremacy of the International Agreement over other legal norms of the Legislative Branch and/or delegated by it), the latter insofar as the specific duty thus established is not the result of a safeguard measure.
VI.- That first of all- the fact that the administrative customs judge obviously does not have the authority to declare inapplicable (for being illegitimate or unconstitutional) the provisions of decree 998/95 and that this Tax Court is not empowered to do so either (art. 1164 of the CA), and insofar as this does not in any way constitute a limitation of jurisdiction preventing any processing and resolution of the case but is merely a reduction of jurisdiction (a reduction limited to the specific aspect of the impossibility of a declaration of unconstitutionality not declared by the CSJN), does not in any way prevent the intervention of said judge and court, as necessary prior steps, within the regulated path for the judgment of certain administrative acts of individual scope (such as the one in question in this case, challenged on the basis of the unconstitutionality of the rule by whose application the challenged act was carried out), for the subsequent hearing of the case and thus of said claim of unconstitutionality, by the judicial Court that continues in the appeal process of that aforementioned regulated process. This is without prejudice to pointing out, of course, that the inhibition imposed on this jurisdictional body (the Tax Court) is only limited to the declaration of unconstitutionality, so nothing would prevent the undersigned from examining the question and even declaring the constitutionality (the eventual compatibility of the challenged norm with the fundamental text), avoiding making a ruling only in the hypothesis of considering that there was a constitutional violation.
VII.- That, having regard to the foregoing, it should be noted first, always within the scope of the litigation, that in the opinion of the undersigned there is no doubt that the Executive Branch, when issuing decree 998/95 and despite invoking in its recitals arts. 11, ap. 2, and 12 of the CA, insofar as it set DIEM levels for the year 1996 (and insofar as this was the continuity of the DIEM originally established by Annex XII of decree 2275/94 art. 15-) strictly speaking made use of the power conferred by art. 663 of the CA (and thus obviously annulled not only previous levels of said Annex XII that were then being modified but also previous Ministerial Resolutions ME- in the same sense).
Consequently, to simply disregard the application of decree 998/95, insofar as it is the exercise of a power delegated by law (and therefore with the same hierarchy as said law) would imply declaring its unconstitutionality, which is prohibited to this Tax Court (art. 1164 of the CA and doctrine in substance of the plenary TFN Telefónica de Arg. SA of 11.6.98, the above without prejudice to leaving aside the opinion of one of the subscribers - the previous member - against said doctrine and in the sense that it would be legally possible for this Court to declare the illegitimacy of a norm delegated by law but only in the case that it were in violation of what was established by the delegating norm); and therefore it is not appropriate to rule in the sense of that invoked by the plaintiff - non-compliance with the requirements provided for by art. 663 of the CA with respect to the issuance of the aforementioned decree. It should be added that it is not, in any case, up to this Tax Court to rule on reasons of merit, convenience or opportunity, or economic policy considerations, which the Executive Branch may have had in establishing the DIEM levels it set in said decree.
VIII.- Therefore, the question is limited to whether the application of the specific duty in question may or may not legitimately exceed the amount that would result from applying the maximum tariff of 35% ad valorem.
It is not disputed that the Argentine Republic assumed the commitment to the maximum import tariff of 35% ad valorem, consolidated in List LXIV and collected or approved by Law 24.425 (without prejudice to the fact that this is effectively established in the Marrakech Agreement and in the aforementioned List, ratified by the aforementioned Law 24.425, and also in the text and the recitals of Resol. ME 806/98, BO 10.7.98, in the same context of the resolution appealed in this case, and in the report on page 174 of this case).
It is also not disputed that the application in this case of the specific duty of US$ 8,60 per pair of the footwear in question results in an amount of import duty that exceeds the amount resulting from the application of 35% ad valorem (which, moreover, results from a simple arithmetic operation with the data from the court); and finally, it is not disputed that it is legitimately possible, in this respect, to exceed the said maximum tariff by exercising and applying a safeguard admitted by the GATT (except that the customs office maintains that the DIEM in question is the application of the DIEM that had been established in 1993 by means of Resolution ME 1696/93 - which in turn constituted a safeguard admitted by the GATT and not expired but in force - at the time of decree 998/95 and the dispatch of the case, while the plaintiff maintains that the procedure for the application of the safeguard with respect to footwear was initiated only in 1997 - by means of Resolution ME 226/97 - which culminated with Resolution ME 987/97 by which the safeguard was imposed for these footwear imports).
From this point of view, it could be validly argued, in the opinion of the undersigned, and without the need to rule on the constitutional invalidity of decree 998/95, that the specific duty established by said decree is (effectively) applicable, so that given its minimum nature - when its calculation in its case does not exceed the amount resulting from the application of the pertinent ad valorem tariff or in its case does not exceed the amount of the maximum tariff of 35% ad valorem, respectively, the exhaustively established percentage or, where appropriate, the specific duty will be applied; but when its calculation exceeds the amount resulting from applying the aforementioned maximum tariff, it will be appropriate to apply the latter, which will mean, plainly and simply, applying in this case - the specific duty up to the limit imposed by said maximum tariff of 35% ad valorem. This application of both the challenged decree and the International Agreement would constitute a solution that is within the scope of, and/or compatible with, the doctrine of the SCJN in the sense that… the interpretation of laws must always be carried out avoiding giving them a meaning that puts their provisions in conflict, destroying one for the other, and adopting as true the one that reconciles them and leaves all of them with value and effect (Judgments 297:142, 300: 1080 and 303: 1041), and that one must not rigorously adhere to the words of the law… when a reasonable and systematic interpretation so requires (Judgments 303:612). In the same vein, it should be kept in mind that art. 665 of the CA, when referring to the power of the EP to set import duties (power of art. 664 which necessarily includes the aforementioned power of art. 663) provides that said powers... must be exercised in compliance with the international agreements in force, which in the opinion of the undersigned reinforces what has been stated above and even more specifically in the sense that... the legislator cannot delegate a power that it does not have, and from the point of view of the legitimacy of a delegation, whether the delegating rule expressly or not, this directive is always present that neither a law nor another rule of lower rank may violate an international treaty (Judgments 317:1282, Considering 10, third paragraph). Precisely, from this last point of view, this Tax Court could, even without violating art. 1164 of the CA, apply this last criterion of the CSJN to the case. Furthermore, the criterion that the specific duty should be applied only up to the maximum of 35% ad valorem (and not as and/or to the extent that this maximum is exceeded) was established in the judgment of 3.10.00, of Chamber 4 of the CNACAF in re RBK ARGENTINA.
It could also be argued (although necessarily within the criteria of the preceding paragraph) that the specific duty established for the merchandise in question by decree 998/95 is not the application of a safeguard admitted by the GATT based on the DIEM established by Resolution ME 1696/93 and in force at the time of the clearance in question, since the safeguard for this merchandise, in the terms of Art. XIX of the GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards (Annex I of the Marrakesh Act, Law 24.425), by which the legitimate imposition above the maximum tariff of 35% would be arrived at, was only initiated with the opening of the investigation - with Resolution ME 226/97 (BO 24.2.97) and culminated in the sense of the provenance of the safeguard - with Resolution ME 987/97. ME 12.9.97/998 (BO 95), this after the issuance of decree 1696/93 and its period of application, and the dispatch of the proceedings, which would not have been carried out if the aforementioned Resolution XNUMX/XNUMX had been in force and applicable to the case.
Finally, it would be decisive, in order to comply with the criteria set out above, the necessary application of the doctrine of the acts themselves, since the administration itself has expressly admitted on various occasions (before and after the liquidation in question and the appealed resolution) the application of said criteria. Such application is evident (although not with specific reference to the products of chapter 64 of the NCM, what is of interest is the substance of the adopted criteria) in General Resolution ME 806/98 (BO 10.7.98), and more concretely and specifically in the Resolutions (for particular cases) of the competent administrative customs judge, Nos. 1565/00, 3938/01, 3169/01, 3170/01 and 3171/01 (see pages 135/136 and 143/150 of the case) in which the aforementioned criterion was accepted exactly, in the sense that the same customs service granted the respective appeals precisely on the basis that the application of the specific duties of decree 998/95… cannot exceed the amount resulting from applying the maximum consolidated tariff of 35% on the customs value of the goods…, this with support in the opinion of the customs legal service, No. 41/00 (see pages 138 bis/139 of the case), which in turn took into account the criterion of the Import Directorate of the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (see pages 137/138 of the case), documents in which It was also stated that... The application of DIEM (refers to the DIEM established, among other provisions, by decree 998/95) on the dispatch... was not as a consequence of a safeguard measure, since in this framework, they were set from the entry into force of Resolution MEy O and SP No. 226/97. Regarding these acts (resolutions and opinions) it should be made clear that although the copies thereof, provided by the plaintiff and contained in the pages of the proceedings respectively indicated, are not official copies, they may nevertheless be considered reliable because, in addition to their evident plausibility, they were forwarded to the treasury (see pages 141 and 154) and the fiscal representative, in the respective responses (pages 153 and 155/156), which she formulated in accordance with the express instructions of her client, not only did not ignore them but (merely) stated that such resolutions adopted the criterion (discussed here) for the particular cases thus resolved and that therefore they are not binding for analogous cases.
IX.- That, notwithstanding what has been set forth herein, it should be noted that in the present case the merchandise in the shipment involved is originally from the People's Republic of China (as appears from the documentation contained in the envelope of the aforementioned shipment contained in the administrative acts, in addition to the fact that this origin is not disputed).
In this regard, the National Directorate of Foreign Trade Policy of the Ministry of Production, as a result of the measure to better provide provided for on page 165 (and reiterated on page 170) informed on page 174 that the People's Republic of China was not a member of the WTO (GATT) on the date of 20.6.96 - the date of registration of the dispatch of the case - and that our country has the obligation to respect the consolidated tariff of 35% only with the member countries of the WTO.
There is therefore no doubt that the criterion set out in recital VIII above could only be applied when dealing with goods originating in GATT member countries, which is not the case in this case, and therefore it must be concluded that in this case the specific duty set by decree 998/95 for the merchandise in question is fully applicable (and not only up to the amount resulting from applying the maximum of 35%) and that therefore the settlement made to guarantee the withdrawal of the merchandise to the market and contested by the plaintiff is correct.
It should also be noted on the point that both the judgment of the CNACAF in re RBK ARGENTINA and the legal opinion on which the Resolutions of the DGA were based, by which particular cases were resolved, acts cited in the preceding recital, placed special emphasis (in order to resolve favourably to the appellant's claim in the respective appeals, in the sense of the application of the specific duty only up to the amount of the maximum 35% ad valorem) on the circumstance that the respective goods were originated in a country that is a member of the Agreement.
This criterion, which in this case results in the inapplicability of the aforementioned maximum tariff of 35% when the merchandise originates in a country that is not a member of GATT (without prejudice to the fact that in any case and for any other reason it might be appropriate to apply ad valorem duties - not for the aforementioned maximum tariff - instead of the specific ones), was already upheld by this Chamber G when ruling also for a case of footwear of PA 6402.99.00 originating in the People's Republic of China - case TF No. 8864-A TIA SA, by ruling of 11.6.99 confirmed by the Superior Court.
The foregoing conclusion is not affected by the provisions of Article II (most favored nation clause) of the Trade Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the People's Republic of China, dated 2.2.77, approved by Law 21.758 (Official Gazette 16.5.78), since, in addition to the fact that there is no record in the case file regarding the validity of said Agreement (see its Articles X and XI), and in addition to the fact that what was agreed in the GATT regarding the maximum consolidated tariff only for its member countries was agreed sixteen years after that Agreement, it is clear that eventually and in any case, the most favored nation clause refers to the advantages that one of the contracting parties could give with respect to one or more specific countries and not to the advantages resulting from a Treaty or integration process, such as the GATT, and in this sense, what is established in Article III of the same Agreement with the People's Republic of China is precisely inscribed.
X.- That consequently, it is appropriate to confirm the appealed resolution and therefore the respective contested settlement, with respect to the dispatch of the proceedings.
Costs must be imposed in the order incurred, despite the result reached (the plaintiff is defeated because the appeal in this case is absolutely unsuccessful), since said result has been reached exclusively for a reason introduced ex officio by this Court and in turn as a consequence of a measure to provide better; to which it should be added that it is the opinion of this Chamber G that such a method of imposition (in the case based on the fact that the aforementioned reasons would be sufficient merit in this regard) is applicable in this case by virtue of the provisions of art. 184 of law 11.683 according to the text given by law 25.239, of compulsory and necessary application to the powers of this Court in customs matters (art. 1163 of the CA), with which the text of said art. is rendered void. 1163 given by decree 1684/93 (on the grounds of this criterion see the majority votes regarding the referred aspect - in the judgment of Chamber E of this TFN in case 10.694-A MOLINOS RIO DE LA PLATA, dated 16.11.2000).
Therefore IT IS RESOLVED:
Confirm in all its parts Resolution DPLA-DVI No. 4476/00 issued in file EAAA No. 420.458/96 and appealed in this case, and therefore confirm the liquidation challenged by the plaintiff with application of the DIEM set by decree 998/95 for merchandise in import clearance No. 77.156-4/96- plus the relevant interest until payment of the total amount owed, and the execution, also ordered in said resolution, of the respective guarantee; with costs in order.
Register, notify, return administrative acts, and file.
